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Security implications of climate development in conflict-affected states 
implications of local-level effects of rural hydropower development on 
farmers in Herat 
Florian Krampe a,*, Elizabeth S. Smith a, Mohammad Daud Hamidi b 
a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Signalistgatan 9, SE-169 70, Solna, Sweden 
b Durham University, UK  
A B S T R A C T   
Development initiatives aimed at mitigating or adapting to climate change impacts may result in unanticipated effects especially in conflict-affected contexts. To 
improved understanding of the implications of future climate development projects in conflict-affected states, this article qualitatively examines the experiences of 
local communities in the Zinda Jan district, located downstream from the Salma Dam in Herat Province, Afghanistan. Conducted in 2018, the research questions what 
local-level side effects (LLSEs) were experienced by communities downstream of the Salma Dam after its 2016 inauguration, and how these LLSEs might affect the 
potential for sustainable peace. The article builds from 25 in-depth interviews with local stakeholders in the Zinda Jan district, and highlights how communities 
generally experienced increased water scarcity after the completion of the dam in 2016, due to poor water management and lack of necessary infrastructure related to 
the dam. This water scarcity was a factor in grievances related to water access among local communities, and increased the likelihood of related communal violence. 
However, local perspectives also indicate desire for joint management of water resources between the state and civilians, from the source to their farms. The article 
provides important insight for research and policy actors to better understand the implications of future climate development projects in conflict-affected states, and 
their inherent contribution and/or risk to broader peace processes.   
1. Introduction 
Successful peacebuilding in fragile and conflict-affected states stops 
violence and prevents relapses into conflict. It must also help societies 
and governments reset their internal relations on a path toward sus-
tainable peace. Climate and environmental pressures are increasingly 
affecting societies, thus making climate adaptation efforts essential for 
wider peacebuilding. Climate development interventions may be detri-
mental to building peace within conflict-affected states also affected by 
climate change because the implementation and management of the 
projects may foster group marginalization by restricting access to re-
sources (Moran et al., 2018). This dynamic can add additional griev-
ances on top of existing issues directly related to the conflict. However, 
negligible attention has been given to understanding the security im-
plications of climate development projects in conflict-affected states. 
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding of this gap by 
studying the implications that climate development projects have in the 
context of peacebuilding.1 The paper investigates the inherent contri-
bution of climate development projects and/or their risk to the broader 
peace process, by investigating: (1) the unanticipated local-level social, 
political, environmental and economic effects linked to the management 
of the Salma Dam project in Herat Province, Afghanistan, and (2) the 
repercussions of these effects on wider peacebuilding. The Salma Dam 
was chosen as a case study of a climate development project in 
Afghanistan for several reasons. 
Afghanistan has tremendous development and climate adaptation 
needs. If unresolved, these will make building peace exponentially more 
difficult because of the adverse impacts of climate and environmental 
change (Krampe & Eklöw, 2019). Afghanistan signed the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, ratified 
it in September 2002, and officially submitted its initial national 
communication in 2013 (UNEP, 2015). In its first nationally determined 
contribution (NDC), submitted in November 2016, Afghanistan 
committed to a 13.6 percent reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions by 2030 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2015). The NDCs sub-
mitted to the UNFCCC work to benefit humans and the environment – 
and they promise “climate security” by limiting vulnerability to climate 
impacts (Barnett, 2007; Barnett & Adger, 2007; (Dabelko, 2013); 
Jernnäs & Linnér, 2019; Remling & Causevic, 2021). Some states have 
explicitly linked their climate mitigation and adaptation actions with 
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ongoing development interventions, particularly to poverty alleviation 
(Antwi-Agyei et al., 2018; Metz & Kok, 2008). 
As major climate development projects linked to the 2016 NDC are 
still unrealized, we select the Salma Dam project as a proxy. The project 
represents both a mitigation and adaptation effort. In regard to miti-
gation, the hydropower resulting from the Salma Dam was recognized in 
the 2019 biennial update report under the UNFCCC by Afghanistan’s 
National Environmental Protection Agency as a source of renewable 
energy (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2019). In the NDC, an increase 
in energy production through hydropower projects, such as the Salma 
Dam, is considered an important measure for reduction of GHG emis-
sions (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2015). The project also works to 
generate hydropower to provide electricity for Herat (Mitra, 2016) 
helping to decarbonize Afghanistan’s energy production. In addition, 
the project aims to provide extensive irrigation schemes throughout a 
region faced with water-shortages, thus supporting adaptation by 
building resilience of farmers and consequently helping to facilitate food 
security (ToloNews, 2016).2 Indeed, in Afghanistan’s National Adapta-
tion Programme of Action for Climate Change (NAPA), projects 
including improved irrigation and water storage systems are included as 
priorities to reduce livelihood vulnerabilities to drought in rural com-
munities (NEPA, 2009). 
To understand the inherent contribution and/or risk of this project to 
the broader peace process, this paper traces the intersecting effects 
experienced by local communities after the dam’s construction across 
several indicators (local-level side effects, LLSEs) and how these expe-
riences have repercussions for state security and the peace process in 
Afghanistan. The paper shows how the conflict-affected context has an 
impact on how Afghanistan’s political–economic system affects material 
and immaterial costs and benefits. The case study finds the impact of the 
flow regime due to improper management after the dam’s inauguration 
in 2016 has affected local communities and in some cases affected the 
prospect for peace in downstream communities. This is because these 
effects in the conflict-affected context generate local inter-group in-
equalities, which foster grievances among groups and against state ac-
tors and also ignite instability. There is indication that the LLSEs on 
downstream communities in the Zinda Jan district of Herat Province 
have affected the prospects for peace and state-building, because they 
further complicate pre-existing distrust against the state and also in-
ternational actors. Much of this takes place in the context of broader 
liberal peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and the inherent normative 
shortcomings and operative failures (Pugh, 2006). Nevertheless, the 
findings of this paper provide important insights into potential successes 
and failures of post-conflict policies and programs related to climate 
development projects. 
The paper first provides a discussion on peacebuilding in Afghanistan 
after 2001. Then, an overview of the research design is provided. This is 
divided into an outline of the framework for conflict-sensitive peace-
building, focusing on domestic factors that may drive or impede durable 
peace, and how it was operationalized with regard to 25 interviews 
conducted with local stakeholders in 2018. The methodology for data 
collection and the scope conditions for the research are discussed. Then, 
the specific water-related background of the country is examined, before 
concentrating on the Salma Dam project and the socioeconomic, socio-
political, and socio-ecological effects experienced by communities 
downstream from the Salma Dam, with a focus on the Zinda Jan district. 
The findings and their impact on peace in Zinda Jan are then analyzed, 
followed by a discussion of the implications of this study. 
2. Past intervention and peacebuilding in Afghanistan 
Affected for decades by conflict, Afghanistan requires significant 
assistance in rebuilding crucial resources. Years of violence severely 
damaged the local economy, as well as the state’s capacity to deliver key 
services (Rubin, 2006). However, the international interventions and 
peacebuilding efforts, theoretically aimed at establishing a liberal 
Afghan-owned state, generally failed to systematically and sustainably 
address the needs of Afghan citizens and rebuild state capacity (Suhrke, 
2013). The actions of the international community – both through the 
UN system as well as bilateral development aid – in Afghanistan were 
generally top-down, conforming to donor-state priorities rather than the 
needs of the country they purported to help (Esser, 2013; Fluri, 2009). 
A case in point is the Bonn conference, convened near Bonn, Ger-
many, in December 2001 under United Nations (UN) leadership but with 
strong influence from the United States of America (USA), to discuss the 
future of Afghanistan (Suhrke, 2008). The USA’s prioritization of the 
“War on Terror” has been argued to have influenced the Bonn talks, 
resulting in an agreement which was “an externally driven division of 
spoils among a hand-picked group of stakeholders who were on the right 
side of the War on Terror,” rather than a peace agreement between 
belligerent actors (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010, p. S82; see also Suhrke, 
2008). The annexes of the resulting Bonn Agreement requested the 
deployment of a UN-mandated force to Kabul to address security con-
cerns, and described the role and function of the UN in the interim 
administration, which was mainly to monitor and assist in the imple-
mentation phase (“Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in 
Afghanistan,” 2001).3 The UN-mandated force, known as the Interna-
tional Security Assistance Force, was created to improve security con-
ditions around Kabul, working to help facilitate the political and 
economic reconstruction process (Saikal, 2006; see also; Azarbaijani--
Moghaddam et al., 2008). In 2002, “all the existing United Nations el-
ements in Afghanistan” were integrated into the United Nations 
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) (United Nations, 2002, p. 
15). UNAMA’s mandate was to assist in implementing the Bonn 
Agreement (Suhrke et al., 2002). The mission had a small budget and 
presence throughout the country (Saikal, 2012). While it was formed to 
aid in facilitating state building and security, UNAMA operated with a 
“light-footprint” approach. Reconstruction efforts were to be primarily 
coordinated among lead donor states and Afghan ministries. However, 
while this approach appeared to prioritize Afghan leadership, it 
contributed to a state-building process with numerous, uncoordinated, 
and often donor-influenced agendas (Ayub et al. p.9). 
As the reconstruction continued, international involvement in policy 
and aid continued to be top-down, even when espousing the language of 
partnership. International involvement was removed from realities and 
long-term development needs on the ground, and failed to recognize 
uneven power relations among international and internal actors 
(Goodhand & Sedra, 2010; see also Ozdemir, 2019). International do-
nors initially channeled finances through a trust fund managed by the 
United Nations Development Programme; however, few continued to do 
so after the first six months of Afghanistan’s interim government. 
Instead, many donors preferred to disburse aid through their own 
mechanisms and processes, thus resulting in fragmented efforts and 
undermining the state’s ability to consolidate legitimacy through service 
provision and resource mobilization (Rubin, 2006). The largest five 
bilateral donor countries during the reconstruction were the United 
States, Japan, the United Kingdom, Germany and India; India, for 
2 It should be noted that significant hydropower projects are viewed with 
concern due to the potential of adverse social and environmental impacts, 
including displacement and biodiversity loss (UNFCCC, 2018). 
3 This was later confirmed by the UN Secretary-General, who noted: “The 
overall objective of UNAMA should be to provide support for the imple-
mentation of the Bonn Agreement processes, including the stabilization of the 
emerging structures of the Afghan Interim Authority, while recognizing that the 
responsibility for the Agreement’s implementation ultimately rests with the 
Afghans themselves” (United Nations, 2002, p. 16). 
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example, funded small and large-scale development projects, and 
channeled money both through the Trust Fund, as well as independently 
through the Afghan government (D’Souza, 2007). 
International aid was often inappropriate and ineffective in the local 
contexts for which it was deployed. For example, donors moved towards 
focusing more resources on projects thought to be able to win ‘hearts and 
minds’ that were associated with counter-insurgency aims, rather than 
Afghan-owned initiatives (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010). The concept of 
“winning hearts and minds” (WHAM) was a notable part of western 
involvement in Afghanistan; it can be understood as “a way of con-
ducting operations that will strengthen the perception of legitimacy for 
the host nation government, as well for the international community 
presence in the country” (Egnell, 2010, p. 292). It was an integral part of 
western counter-insurgency operations, and pursued the liberal ideolo-
gies of pursuing modernization as conceptualized by the West (Egnell, 
2010; Ozdemir, 2019). While some indicate the comparative success of 
certain types of linked cash-transfer and vocational training programs in 
Afghanistan (Lyall et al., 2013) and other smaller initiatives in different 
contexts (Berman et al., 2013), the discourse around the hearts and 
minds approach could often be removed from priorities and realities of 
the people of Afghanistan (Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008). 
Disjointed interventions arguably worked against the larger goal of 
state-building (Goodhand & Sedra, 2010). 
Much of this can be attributed to the dominant liberal peacebuilding 
doctrine that influenced international intervention in Afghanistan after 
2001 (Suhrke, 2007). Liberal peacebuilding emerged after the Cold War 
as the normative way for the international community to construct 
lasting peace. In theory, to achieve liberal peace, international actors 
would support post-conflict states in building strong democratic in-
stitutions and a capitalistic market economy (Newman, 2009; Paris, 
2004). However, liberal peacebuilding interventions have been argued 
to prioritize the capitalistic interests of external actors; they could often 
be inappropriate and harmful for the contexts they operated in (Pugh, 
2006). 
The international peacebuilding agenda has since broadened from its 
focus on liberal ideologies; failures in the approach in Afghanistan 
arguably contributed to this (de Coning, 2018). Once a significant actor 
in liberal peacebuilding interventions, the UN has since shifted towards 
the concept of “Sustaining Peace.” This concept recognizes the limita-
tions of a template approach to peace, and focuses on “supporting the 
political and social capacities that sustain peace” (de Coning, 2018, p. 
304). Issues of inclusivity and the environment became featured more 
prominently in UN peacebuilding efforts. The joint UN–World Bank 
Pathways for Peace report highlighted the impacts of environmental 
stressors on conflict, the need for inclusive approaches to conflict pre-
vention, and the importance of addressing grievances related to exclu-
sion (World Bank & United Nations, 2018). Inclusive peacebuilding 
approaches that respond and are accountable to the needs of local 
communities rather than donor states are crucial (Campbell, 2018). 
If peacebuilding efforts are not inclusive, research finds that a failure 
to account for the agency of local actors can work against achieving 
sustainable peace, instead resulting in a “hybrid” peace that was sought 
by neither locals nor international actors (Mac Ginty, 2010; Mac Ginty & 
Richmond, 2013). Indeed, in Afghanistan, Barma argues that while 
UNAMA “played kingmaker, alternative loci of power to the center 
continue to thrive and threaten democratic consolidation” (Barma, 
2006, p. 129). Actors working to sustain peace need to give careful 
consideration to group-level dynamics and the agency of local actors. 
Recent research on inequality and grievances in relation to civil war 
incentivizes focus on the intermediate (group-level) mechanisms 
(Cederman et al., 2013). Group inequalities may contribute to instability 
and conflict should people perceive a disparity between what they have 
and what they believe they deserve, especially in relation to what others 
in the same society are understood to have (Gurr, 1970; Stewart, 2000; 
Østby et al., 2009). Identity politics can further mobilize groups to 
address grievances related to social, political, cultural, or economic 
inequalities (Cederman et al., 2013; Stewart, 2008). 
Against the backdrop of the broader liberal peacebuilding project in 
Afghanistan, this paper looks explicitly at the way that climate devel-
opment projects in this context affect local actors, and aims to under-
stand their interactions with and inherent contribution and/or risk to 
the broader peace process. 
3. Research design 
This study used a new approach for conflict-sensitive climate 
development that focused on the domestic drivers and inhibitors of 
durable peace (Swatuk & Wirkus, 2018). This approach looks to care-
fully delineate “between local-level side effects of climate action and 
negative effects reaching back to the state (through different pathways 
and at different levels)” (Swatuk et al., 2020, p. 1). While envisioned 
outside of the conflict context, we correspondingly adapted the delim-
itations of the original framework by specifically highlighting the con-
flict dynamics and the role of international peacebuilding actors in its 
operationalization. The framework provided a structure to trace and 
contextualize the emergence of unanticipated and unintended conse-
quences of climate development interventions on the local community 
level. In addition, it allowed us to elaborate how these local conse-
quences potentially result in compounding pre-existing negative per-
ceptions about state actors as well as international peacebuilding actors, 
thereby affecting the peace process. By “state,” we mean government 
actors taking decisions as representatives of the state; by “international 
peacebuilding actors” we mean actors in UN or other multilateral peace 
operations. 
3.1. Operationalization 
The approach consisted of three consecutive mechanisms of inquiry. 
These mechanisms can be understood similar to Hedström and Swed-
berg’s typology of social mechanisms. Hedström and Swedberg’s 
“macro–micro–macro” conceptualization of social change posits that 
change occurs on a macro scale due to actions of individuals, which were 
influenced by a different macro-scale event in the past. They put forth 
the idea of “macro–micro,” “micro–micro,” and “micro–macro” mech-
anisms. This typology works to describe how: macro-scale events can 
influence individuals (macro–micro), the actions of individuals can in-
fluence the behavior of others (micro–micro), and this collective action 
can lead to macro-scale impacts (micro–macro) (Hedström & Swedberg, 
1998). 
Drawing from this conceptualization, this case study used a three- 
step process, based on that of Swatuk et al. (2018) (see Fig. 1). First, 
this involved inquiry around the implementing of a project through state 
actors in a specific locality (macro–micro). Second, climate development 
programs and policies can result in potential and unexpected local-level 
social, political, environmental, and economic externalities (micro-
–micro), which we evaluated as LLSEs. We argue that the second-order 
effects stemming from these LLSEs have the potential to negatively feed 
back to the state actors as well as international peacebuilding actors (see 
e.g., Hedström & Swedberg, 1998). This is likely to occur on multiple 
political levels (e.g., local, regional, and national), at various geographic 
scales (e.g., watershed, forest, landscape, and ecosystem), with 
numerous impacts (e.g., political and economic instability, social unrest, 
and violence) (Swatuk et al., 2018). Third, because of these multilevel 
and scalar effects, we expected micro–macro effects, that is state-level 
effects that impact the prospects of sustainable climate development 
and the peacebuilding process at large (Swatuk et al., 2018). It is well 
noted that these state-level impacts on peacebuilding and security are 
not solely linked to a specific intervention, but are compounded by other 
external factors in an unstable and fragile setting dominated by a wider 
liberal peacebuilding discourse. 
This study utilized indicators derived from literature on develop-
ment, and peacebuilding to qualitatively measure the LLSEs and state- 
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level effects of implemented climate development programs and pol-
icies. It discerned empirically demonstrable and intersecting social, 
economic, ecological, and political impacts on local communities 
through 25 interviews conducted with local stakeholders in Zinda Jan 
district. Related questions in these interviews focus on performance of, 
trust in, and interaction with government actors and international 
peacebuilders (see also Krampe, 2016). Additionally, questions exam-
ined perceptions of other groups, as well as opinions on water access and 
specific local impacts experienced after the building of the Salma Dam. 
The indicators used in the analytical approach measure 
governance-level impacts resulting from a feedback loop generated by 
LLSEs. These indicators work to assess social, political, economic, and 
ecological dynamics, to evaluate potential threats to sustainable peace 
that emerge on the local scale. Annex 1 provides all questions used in the 
interviews and coded indicators used to determine LLSEs and state-level 
effects stemming from the climate development action. 
3.2. Data collection 
The empirical data for this study was collected over two cycles 
during the summer of 2018 in villages downstream from the Salma Dam 
in the Zinda Jan district of Herat Province. The aim was to study how the 
management of the Salma Dam project has affected the prospect for 
peace in downstream communities. 
The Zinda Jan district covers 2096.41 km2 and encompasses 82 
villages (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2018) with an estimated total 
population of 64,569 (Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2020). 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted in the center of the district 
(including Qala-e-Naw and other villages downstream), and in the 
Shakiban village (which includes a few small villages downstream). The 
demographic composition of the villages is not homogenous; residents of 
different ethnicities reside in the same locality. 
When this study mentions water users from Zinda Jan, it refers to 
people living in the district center surrounding villages including Qala-e- 
Naw and villages downstream. Water users from Shakiban are people 
from Shakiban village and a few small villages downstream (see Fig. 5). 
The term “internally displaced people (IDPs)” generally refers to people 
identifying with one ethnic group, and moving to this district in groups 
of 20–50 families due to insecurity in their home districts. Zinda Jan, 
controlled by the Afghan Government, is comparatively more peaceful 
than surrounding districts, including the areas of origin of the IDPs. 
This locality was selected as it is a large area downstream of the dam 
where the primary source of income for locals is agriculture (Interna-
tional Help Institute, 2018). The primary interviewees were local Mir-
abs4 and farmers. Mirabs were selected because their views may be 
considered as being representative of all local stakeholders due to their 
position of traditionally elected mediators of water management and 
related disputes over access (Thomas & Ahmad, 2009). As local liaisons 
with the government, they also understand the relevant dynamics be-
tween local communities and the state surrounding water access. 
Farmers were interviewed to gain further perspective on local opinions 
related to water access. Additional interviews with religious elites 
(interviewed because they are trusted community representatives) and 
regional experts were conducted to better understand the national and 
local processes. These interviews were supported by field observations. 
Given the security context in these communities, 25 interviews were 
conducted. Seven interviews were conducted in the Shakiban village, 
while the other interviews represent opinions from other villages in 
Zinda Jan. The Annex 1 details a list of anonymized interviewees and the 
questions asked; these questions were guided by the operationalization 
of the approach, discussed above. Consent was verbally obtained from 
all interviewees, and all interviews were recorded and transcribed. 
3.3. Scope definition 
Delimitation and clarification of the scope of the study are necessary. 
First, this study focuses on climate development and its links to and 
interactions with conflict and peacebuilding. We contextualize this focus 
within an understanding of how the specific dynamics of a conflict- 
affected state can impact the effects of a climate development project. 
This is represented by the encompassing yellow box in Fig. 1. The 
guiding question is how the management of the Salma Dam project has 
affected communities and by extension the prospect for peace in 
downstream communities. We focus on this to gain a better under-
standing of the implications of forthcoming climate development pro-
jects in conflict-affected states and understand their inherent 
contribution and/or risk to the broader peace process. We are concerned 
with interactions in both directions as we anticipate climate develop-
ment can interfere with conflict dynamics, but moreover that conflict 
dynamics can interfere with climate development. The same is true in 
relation to peacebuilding. 
Second, we are placing the relationship between society and the 
state, and how this links with actions of international peacebuilders, at 
the center of the approach. This corresponds with an understanding of 
peacebuilding as rooted in the relationship between politics, namely the 
state in particular, and wider society (Migdal, 2001). The perceived 
legitimacy of the relationship between the domestic state and society 
constitutes the foundation of the social and political postwar order 
(Krampe, 2016; Richmond & Mac Ginty, 2020; Themnér & Ohlson, 
2014). The various interactions between domestic state and nonstate 
actors are shaping post-conflict peacebuilding. In the context of inter-
national peacebuilding interventions, such as in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, East Timor, and Kosovo, the domestic relationship between the 
state and society is shaped by the relational dynamics among different 
domestic and international actors (Krampe & Ekman, 2020; Mac Ginty, 
2010). 
Fig. 1. Analytical approach for conflict-affected contexts, adapted from Swatuk et al. (2018).  
4 A Mirab is “typically a community leader or elder elected by local farmers to 
manage operation of the irrigation system and control water distribution ac-
cording to agreed arrangements” (UNAMA Rule of Law Unit, 2016, p. 4). 
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4. Water security and implementation of the Salma Dam project 
(macro–micro) 
Geographically imbalanced water discharge and its considerable 
seasonal variation affect irrigation in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has five 
major river basins (Fig. 2). Due to snowmelt from the Hindukush 
mountains, two of the basins – Amu Darya and Kabul – account for 83 
percent of the country’s mean annual water discharge. In addition, 
Afghanistan’s rivers are often inundated in the spring due to heavy rain 
and snowmelt. River discharge is at its lowest during the summer, posing 
challenges for irrigation due to high water requirements during this 
season (Favre & Kamal, 2004). The impacts of climate change – notably, 
drought – further challenge consistent access to water resources (Iqbal 
et al., 2018). Between 1960 and 2008, average annual temperatures in 
Afghanistan increased by 0.6 ◦C (World Bank, 2020). The frequency of 
drought cycles has notably increased in recent years (World Bank, 
2020), with a severe drought in 2017/2018 (FAO, 2019). 
Consequently, appropriate and formal irrigation infrastructure is 
highly important, but unfortunately minimal, in Afghanistan. According 
to a water expert at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO), Afghanistan has only 10 percent formally irrigated 
agricultural areas.5 External actors have supported various water sector 
infrastructure projects (Favre & Kamal, 2004). However, this support 
contributed to negative social, political, and economic ramifications. 
Programming in the 20th century prompted the resettlement of farm 
families, negatively affecting farmer tribal and ethnic networks (Scott, 
1980). Increasing commercialization of agriculture in the 20th century 
further contributed to inequalities that eventually fed into the counter 
revolution against the Soviet occupation (Gibbs, 1986). 
The Salma Dam in Herat Province (see Fig. 3), which was funded by 
the Government of India, is the only major water infrastructure built in 
Afghanistan since modernization projects in the middle of the 20th 
century.6 The decades of conflict in the country stagnated dam con-
struction and maintenance of water sector infrastructure (Ahlers et al., 
2014). While the Salma dam was initiated in 1976, progress on its 
construction was halted due to conflict (Ahlers et al., 2014; Nagheeby 
et al., 2019). In 2004 India decided to fund the construction of the dam, 
which would later be known as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam 
(Mullen & Arora, 2016). The Salma Dam was inaugurated in 2016 at a 
cost of approximately US$290 million (United Nations Security Council, 
2017). The dam opened in June 2016 in a joint ceremony with Indian 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Afghan President Ashraf Ghani. 
The impacts of large water infrastructures are many and well known 
(see also Swatuk & Wirkus, 2018). The Afghan Government was well 
aware of the Salma Dam’s far-reaching transnational impacts on 
Afghanistan’s neighbors in the Harirud Basin – notably Iran and 
Turkmenistan. Nevertheless, with the construction of the dam, the 
Afghan Government engaged in a “unilateral ‘resource capture’ strat-
egy” (Thomas & Warner, 2015, p. 601). The anticipated outcomes of 
water security in Herat Province – especially the anticipated availability 
of water at the end of summer, which would support better harvests and 
a diversification of crops – appeared to outweigh other concerns. Ac-
cording to some studies, the dam project would be able to provide 42, 
000 ha of land with additional water, and 40,000 ha of land would be 
newly irrigated (Thomas & Warner, 2015). 
Increasing water security for farmers in the region was certainly one 
of the major intentions behind the construction of the dam. Yet, the 
political drivers behind the project also included strengthening of 
bilateral partnerships with India as expressed by Abdullah Abdullah, 
Head of Unity Government, in June 2016 (Afghantelex, 2016). The 
project is “a positive and effective step towards growth, development 
and progress” for Afghanistan, and: 
“The completion of the Salma Dam construction is an unprecedented 
and unique step in the development of Afghanistan. Moreover, it is a 
clear indication of the friendship of Afghanistan and India. Afghanistan 
and India have historic relationships, and these relationships have al-
ways been in line with friendship, good intentions and cooperation. 
India always contributes to the development of Afghanistan and the 
welfare of the Afghan people, and Afghans appreciate this cooperation 
from India.” (Author translation from Abdullah in Afghantelex, 2016). 
The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and India over the 
construction of the dam and direct investment made by India can also be 
seen in the context of wider geopolitical interests rather than purely in 
the goal of development (Nagheeby & Warner, 2018).7 Nevertheless, it 
is noteworthy that the project is seen as part of the wider peacebuilding 
effort in Afghanistan. For example, the 2017 report of the UN 
Secretary-General on the situation in Afghanistan included the 2016 
inauguration of the dam by Afghanistan’s President and India’s Prime 
Minister among its metrics for regional cooperation, in order to work 
towards “sustained and effective regional coordination in support of 
prosperity, peace and stability” (United Nations Security Council, 2017 Fig. 2. River basins and major irrigation schemes in Afghanistan. Irrigation 
scheme data retrieved from Favre and Kamal (2004). 
Fig. 3. Map of Herat Province, showing the location of Salma Dam and the 
Harirud River Basin. 
5 Personal communication with FAO official.  
6 Personal communication with FAO official. 
7 An analysis of the geopolitical background of the Salma Dam is beyond the 
scope of this paper. For further information, please see Nagheeby and Warner 
(2018). 
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p. 29 of security council citation). 
5. Local-level side effects of the Salma Dam project 
(micro–micro) 
The Salma Dam project was intended to provide water security and 
resilience for farmers in the surrounding region. However, as investi-
gation of the LLSEs suggests, locals downstream of the structure expe-
rienced a variety of closely interrelated social, economic, political, and 
ecological effects (see Fig. 4). Interviewee experiences and perspectives 
suggest they were often water insecure due to improper dam manage-
ment, which caused changes in flow after construction of the dam. 
At that point, state water management of the Salma Dam was focused 
on generating hydropower, with little effort made to assist local irriga-
tion.8 Water access was further complicated by the use of the Taximot 
Hakobe Ab by mirabs in Herat. The Taximot Hakobe Ab is a manual 
written in the 15th century by Abdul Rahman Jami, outlining distribu-
tion of water through irrigation. It is not publicly available, but maps out 
the design of irrigation systems, formulas for calculating water flows, 
and rules regarding the allocation of water within irrigation systems 
(UNAMA, 2016). However, these rules have not been updated to reflect 
changes in the landscape. Factors like agricultural land expansion, the 
impacts of climate change on river flows, etc. have increased pressure on 
the Harirud’s resources (see also Nagheeby et al., 2019). These tradi-
tional rules are arguably outdated for the context they are administered 
in. Thus, water insecurity resulted from water management, outdated 
traditional regulations, and lack of necessary infrastructure like canals 
as well as an increasingly wide riverbed spanning 1000 m in certain 
places. This water insecurity impacted livelihoods in Zinda Jan and 
contributed to increased social and political tensions in downstream 
communities over access to water. 
Interviewees mentioned how local communities downstream of the 
dam in Zinda Jan looked forward to improved water security and access 
after installation of the dam. However, after its completion, many did 
not receive water when they needed it. The storage and timed release of 
the water from the dam’s reservoir conflicted with downstream com-
munities’ traditional use of water. Responses from interviews demon-
strated many locals experienced a lack of water during the summer. 
Some had water one day but not the next. The crops of some villagers 
upstream of the dam benefited from this, while the livelihoods of others 
were destroyed on the downstream side. Interviewees remarked on how 
water was not available when they needed it or how it caused flooding 
when released. One farmer detailed how wheat and saffron harvests 
were ruined, as the dam either did not release water when necessary, or 
inundated the crops when it was not.9 Some interviewees perceived the 
dam as having positive effects on their livelihoods, likely due to their 
location in relation to the structure. One local specifically stated that 
“the Salma Dam had less impact on Zinda Jan; it had greater impact in 
the regions near to the dam site.”10 
Some interviewees considered the dam project had a negative 
impact, and discussed how they would not be able to harvest at all if they 
did not have access to groundwater from wells.11 However, other locals 
confirmed water was released in the summer when they needed it for 
their crops, and they had frequently benefited from the dam and 
reservoir. 
Even when locals had to dig wells to access groundwater, it is likely 
not all were able to equitably access this resource. One interviewee 
mentioned how people with land and financial resources would dig 
wells; if they were not able to dig their own wells, they would go to 
neighbors for water.12 Further, testimony from Mirabs and farmers 
indicated groundwater levels were falling. A young farmer noted how 
wells needed to be dug deeper to reach necessary water.13 A Mirab 
described how a decade ago an irrigation well was dug to a depth of 
27.5 m, with 18 m of water inside the well, and its water could be 
collected approximately 9.5 m from the surface. The water levels fluc-
tuated naturally, depending on the season. However, at the time of the 
interview, water was accessible at 13 m from the surface of the well, as 
opposed to 9.5 m.14 
Climate change may have further affected water levels. Some note 
how, since October 2017, high temperatures and low precipitation rates 
have reduced “snow depths, river flows, water level in dams, water ta-
bles and soil moistures” in Afghanistan, thus directly affecting agricul-
tural production (IFRC, 2018, p. 1). In Herat, droughts are noted to 
affect groundwater levels (Iqbal, 2018). Indeed, a Mirab further dis-
cussed how these ecological changes directly affected groundwater 
levels and exacerbated inequitable water between residents located 
upstream and downstream of the Harirud river. The water table was 
higher in the upstream area, and residents there consequently had more 
regular access than downstream residents to water through wells, in 
addition to the river water.14 These circumstances are concerning, as 
recent research finds lack of groundwater can lead to communal 
violence. This likelihood is magnified in areas affected by drought, poor 
state involvement, and inadequate infrastructure (Döring, 2020). 
Government initiatives to divert water for communities, likely fun-
ded by international assistance, did not improve water allocation and 
timely distribution. One interviewee discussed the effects of a canal built 
by the government in his village, which traditionally always had water. 
Livestock could no longer access water due to the wall height of the 
canal, and their owners were consequently compelled to dig wells to 
help them survive.15 The Afghan Government was largely dependent on 
foreign aid for its post-conflict development; this aid often mapped on to 
donor priorities rather than the needs of intended beneficiaries (Good-
hand & Sedra, 2010; Rubin, 2006; Suhrke, 2013). This also applied to 
the water sector. 
International donors had varying interests and aims relating to water 
management policies and projects, with initiatives that were often 
poorly coordinated or influenced by geopolitics and local security. Do-
nors would also often be reluctant to involve themselves in projects 
related to transboundary water disputes or in areas considered to be a 
high security risk (Ahlers et al., 2014). The Salma Dam project arguably 
represents both. It is a concern for downstream riparians due to reduced 
water flows (Jain, 2018; Nagheeby et al., 2019). The dam site has also 
experienced attacks and insecurity (Ahlers et al., 2014). While interna-
tional funding and projects aligned with donor expectations, they may 
not have met the needs and expectations of local communities.16 One 
FAO official described how UNAMA coordinated reconstruction work, 
and after 2001, international donors in the form of provincial recon-
struction teams continued to rehabilitate irrigation schemes. However, 
these actors did not consult with the relevant ministry, and their work 
was often inadequate.17 Indeed, reporting indicates that water sector 
8 Water management in Afghanistan is complex. After 2002, Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM) was promoted as an approach to water man-
agement, and new legislation overlaid institutional reforms like Water User 
Associations (WUAs) with the traditional mirab system. On a local level, mirabs 
play a notable role in negotiating disputes over water. Three mirabs generally 
manage each canal, with one for the upper, middle, and lower parts. For further 
information, please see: Thomas and Ahmad (2009), A Historical Perspective on 
the Mirab System: A Case Study of the Jangharoq Canal, Baghlan; and Thomas, 
Azizi & Ghafoori (2013) Water rights and conflict resolution processes in 
Afghanistan: The case of the Sar-i-Pul sub-basin.  
9 Interview: 1_1E.  
10 Interview: 2_14E.  
11 Interview: 2_6E. 
12 Interview: 2_6E.  
13 Interview: 2_11E.  
14 Interview: 2_3E.  
15 Interview: 1_1E.  
16 Personal communication with regional expert.  
17 Personal communication with FAO official. 
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reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan backed by the USA were often 
ineffective and unsuitable for the context they operated in, despite sig-
nificant financial investments (SIGAR, 2014). 
In Zinda Jan, interviews showed perceptions among locals that 
internationally backed water infrastructure projects did not ensure 
equal and sustainable water access. One farmer described how, while his 
crops benefited from the dam, his friends in different areas could not 
access water. He stated: “I guess that between Zinda Jan and Salma Dam 
they built 72 weirs. Every one diverts water in a way. Most of the weirs 
are constructed [of] concrete. I have friends from Chishti Sharif and Obe 
who say they are bothered by water. In short, some people get water, 
and some don’t.”18 This highlights the need for the development of 
necessary infrastructure like canals that could improve water access in 
downstream communities, as a step to reform old water allocation 
regulations.19 
Past attempts at infrastructure projects related to the dam received 
mixed reviews from locals. Some interviewees described how interna-
tional actors had implemented irrigation projects with impacts that they 
felt were negative. One Imam specifically detailed he believed the weirs 
built by international donors negated water access for his area as well as 
for places upstream. However, he also discussed how a constructed canal 
made water allocation easier between the village and local farms.20 
These perspectives and the lack of infrastructure needed for water access 
experienced in Zinda Jan reflect the point that international aid con-
forms with donor mandates without necessarily effectively aligning with 
collective citizen needs.21 
The broader discord in international assistance was reflected in 
general local perceptions of international peacebuilders. While some 
locals commented they benefited from completed international devel-
opment projects, many interviewees described how the presence of in-
ternational actors, including UNAMA, ultimately did not help them, and 
was generally short term instead of being a sustainable investment. 
Locals believed international actors became involved in Afghanistan for 
their own gain, and many people stated that the presence of interna-
tional actors caused social problems and fissures within their commu-
nities. For example, some interviewees discussed how international 
peacebuilders did not provide aid equally throughout the community.22 
This caused resentment among neighbors who did not receive aid, and 
stress for local council members who were in charge of disbursing it.23 
Untimely water release from the Salma Dam, lack of infrastructure to 
carry water from the dam’s reservoir to downstream areas, outdated 
water allocation regulations, and changing environmental conditions 
arguably contributed to increasing water scarcity in downstream areas 
such as Zinda Jan and even further downstream in Ghorian district. 
Interviews showed these perceptions of scarcity were in relation to past 
use and also to the perceived time of access of other communities. 
Subsequent grievances among locals in relation to water access when 
needed contributed to low-level instability and conflict. Indeed, a vio-
lent conflict erupted between villages over the installation of a diversion 
weir, which would diminish the already low access experienced by 
certain communities by diverting more water to another. Interviewees 
also expressed varying opinions on IDPs in relation to competition over 
water use; experiences of water scarcity may have exacerbated the 
negative sentiments expressed on IDPs (see Fig. 6). 
Fig. 4. Analytical approach highlighting implementation and intended outcomes of the Salma Dam project in Zinda Jan district, Herat Province, Afghanistan. 
Adapted from Swatuk et al. (2018). 
Fig. 5. Zinda Jan district south of Harirud River and diversion irriga-
tion channels. 
18 Interview: 2_13E.  
19 Weirs are barriers across the river, which function to ensure a consistent 
minimum depth of water upstream of the structure. As part of intake structures, 
they work to influence the potential water access for canals. (Thomas & Ahmad, 
2009). The weirs referred to in this research are financed within different 
development projects, either directly through a donor or through the 
government. 
20 Interview: 2_8E.  
21 Personal communication with regional expert.  
22 Interviews: 2_15E and 1_4E.  
23 Interview: 2_15E. 
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Furthermore, while some interviewees unequivocally stated that 
social and economic conditions vastly improved after 2001, some felt 
there was more security, peace, and access to water and job opportu-
nities under Taliban rule. This may be an indication of survivorship bias. 
This should be of concern for the Afghan Government and peace-
builders, not least because decreases in livelihoods and reduced income 
opportunities for farmers have, in other cases, been linked to increased 
crime and can be a fertile ground for insurgency recruitment (Krampe & 
Nordqvist, 2018; Axbard, 2016; van Baalen & Mobjörk, 2018). Issues of 
experienced water scarcity and related insecurity in Zinda Jan were not 
felt in isolation from the broader conflict context. Interviewees generally 
considered Zinda Jan to be more secure than Afghanistan in its entirety. 
However, depending on the age of the interviewees, they could either 
not remember a time when there was peace in Afghanistan or remem-
bered peace in the country prior to the Taliban. 
6. State-level effects (micro–macro) 
As discussed in the previous section, local downstream communities 
experienced temporally and geographically disparate levels of water 
access. The mitigation of these effects was challenged by the impacts of 
the conflict, especially on local water management and conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms. Local perspectives of the state and international 
peacebuilders further hindered the potential of successful peace-
building. This section discusses how the conflict context contributes to 
perceptions of resource scarcity experienced in Zinda Jan, and then how 
this scarcity compounds with new and existing grievances. Grievances 
and related low-level violence can notably impact state security and the 
broader peacebuilding processes (World Bank & United Nations, 2018). 
6.1. Perceptions of contextual resource scarcity 
Internationally influenced water management reforms and weak 
governance in post-conflict Afghanistan arguably further affected 
resource scarcity experienced in downstream communities. Foreign 
donors backed water sector management reforms based on the inter-
nationally promoted principle of integrated water resource management 
(IWRM) (Ahlers et al., 2014). The principles of IWRM intended to in-
crease democratic governance of water management by integrating lo-
cals into decision-making processes, e.g. through water-user 
associations (WUAs) that are part of sub-basin and basin councils, which 
serve as advisory bodies to the decision-making of state actors (Weger-
ich, 2009). However, while these reforms nominally promoted align-
ment with traditional Mirab water management systems, it was unclear 
as to how they would actively do so in practice (Ahlers et al., 2014; 
Thomas & Ahmad, 2009; Wegerich, 2009). This is likely problematic for 
local communities, as coexisting regulations may “hamper existing 
informal conflict resolution or enable corrupt local politicians to make 
ownership rules more favorable to themselves” (Döring, 2020, p. 4; see 
also; Benjaminsen & Lund, 2002; Turner et al., 2012). 
Concerns were raised about the low water level in the Salma Dam 
reservoir and distribution of water among eight districts downstream of 
Dam (Jahanmal, 2016). Therefore, in December 2016, a temporary 
commission (called the commission for allocation and equitable distri-
bution of Hari-Rud’s water) was established, with the initial aim of 
equitable allocation of water and paving the way for establishing a 
sub-basin council (Osmani, 2016). As part of the 2009 Water Law, 
sub-river basin councils and river basin councils are the legal base for 
inclusion of Water User Associations (WUAs) and Irrigation Associations 
(IAs) as consulting bodies for decision making (Ministry of Justice, 
2009). 
There is an ongoing discussion in which the commission is struggling 
with decision making about water allocation. Indeed, most interviewees 
were not aware of sub-river basin councils. They believed the commis-
sion was highly ineffectual at providing water and at settling disputes 
about resource allocation. Most interviewees recognized Mirabs as the 
actors responsible for water management at the local level, and saw the 
government as being largely absent, corroborating the inefficacy of 
internationally backed water sector reforms. 
A general consensus across all interviews was that the best way to 
manage water was for the government to work with local people. 
Research in the northern Kunduz River Basin indicated how the post- 
conflict setting led to Mirabs capitalizing on weak and dysfunctional 
local government structures and controlling downstream water access 
through bribes (Thomas & Ahmad, 2009). Zinda Jan residents experi-
enced similar problems with Mirabs in their community and became 
frustrated due to inadequate representation in decision-making pro-
cesses and lack of transparency in water allocation. These issues 
contributed to a desire for increased government involvement in water 
management that would actively incorporate local needs and perspec-
tives. This, in turn, would likely mitigate the potential of violence 
around water scarcity (see Döring, 2020). 
While interviewee perspectives on the post-conflict government 
were mixed, many people thought it worked in its own interest. 24 One 
interviewee specifically stated that “The government is not our repre-
sentative. It is good with foreigners; it took their money for its own 
benefit.”25 Another interviewee remarked on how decisions surrounding 
water allocation were politically motivated: 
Fig. 6. Analytical approach highlighting LLSEs of the Salma Dam project in Zinda Jan, Herat Province, Afghanistan. Adapted from Swatuk et al. (2018).  
24 Interviews: 1_1E, 1_2E, 1_4E, 2_13E, and 2_11E.  
25 Interview: 1_4E. 
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“Look, water management is turned to politics, because if water is 
managed essentially, then there will be problems for our neighbors 
[countries]. You know, the government is not united in making de-
cisions for the people of our country. You know, in the government, 
there are people whose decisions relate to the interests of neigh-
boring countries, that’s why water is not properly managed to pre-
vent compromising the interests of neighboring countries. This 
government does not consider much of its own interests and con-
siders its political interests even more.”26 
However, the desire for government involvement in water manage-
ment as demonstrated by interviews indicates locals were not inherently 
against the state and its involvement in large-scale water projects, pro-
vided this involvement incorporated their needs and perspectives and 
ensured necessary access to resources (see also World Bank & United 
Nations, 2018). 
6.2. From resource scarcity to local grievances and increased insecurity 
There is indication that in Zinda Jan, communities’ perceived water 
scarcity appears to have contributed to the strengthening of inter-group 
grievances and insecurity on a local scale (see Fig. 7). These grievances 
have a direct impact on the potential of small-scale violence (see also 
Azarbaijani-Moghaddam et al., 2008). Perspectives on the Shakiban 
village from other communities in Zinda Jan indicate how resource 
scarcity and perception of state involvement in inequitable water allo-
cation may lead to the construction and exacerbation of group identity 
differences, as well as to related low-level violence as suggested by 
previous research (Stewart, 2008; Østby et al., 2011). Friction among 
groups based on perceived identity differences and the related possi-
bilities of violence surrounding competition for water access is further 
observable within perspectives on IDP groups in interviews from Zinda 
Jan locals (see Stewart, 2008). The economic dependency on successful 
agriculture within Zinda Jan likely further exacerbates the potential of 
inter-group conflicts surrounding water scarcity and access (see Magnus 
Theisen, 2008). Negative perspectives of state actors, as well as a 
generally negative outlook on the legitimacy of foreign peacebuilders, 
indicate compounding challenges to ensuring peace and stability in the 
area. 
The scarcity of resources in Zinda Jan led to collective grievances and 
perceptions of increasingly diminished access due to competition from 
neighboring groups and IDPs. Neighboring communities’ experiences of 
water scarcity and fear of increasingly limited resource access have 
contributed to inter-group grievances and subsequent low-level violence 
(Fjelde & von Uexkhull, 2012). Local livelihoods throughout Herat 
Province are dependent on access to natural resources, and economic 
activity in Zinda Jan and surrounding areas is no exception (NSIA 
Afghanistan, 2018). All villages in the Zinda Jan district depended on 
water from the Harirud river controlled by the Salma Dam during the 
summer. 
Prior to the inauguration of the Salma dam, all communities had 
adequate access to water from the Hari Rud. However, after the dam was 
built, the Shakiban’s water supply fell short. A conflict broke out in the 
Zinda Jan district between communities including Qala-e-Naw and 
other villages downstream and Shakiban village over Shakiban’s 
attempt to build a new diversion weir alongside the position of one 
already established by communities of Qala-e-Naw and other villages 
downstream. Potential changes or new constructions in water infra-
structure are traditionally agreed upon after consultations with relevant 
water users. One mirab described that when the downstream villages 
built their weir six years prior, the Shakiban did not participate, and 
remained silent about it for years.27 When the Shakiban asked to build 
alongside the original weir in the past year, the communities of Qala-e- 
Naw and other villages downstream refused to share the position of their 
original weir, and local government officials negotiated for Shakiban to 
build the weir further downstream. However, this agreement fell 
through when close to 600 people from Shakiban arrived, armed, to 
open the canal at its intake. A fight broke out that the district governor, 
who was understood by downstream residents to support Shakiban, 
failed to control. Over 10 individuals were injured, with one Mirab 
losing an eye.28 Local news subsequently reported that 32 individuals 
were hurt in the violence, as registered in the district health clinic 
(Ariana Herat, 2018). Downstream locals subsequently pushed for 
dismissal of the governor who favored Shakiban, and succeeded.29 
Communities experiencing resource scarcity and related inequitable 
access among groups due to state involvement have potential to develop 
and strengthen perceived political and economic inequalities and 
related grievances and violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999; Homer-Dixon & 
Blitt, 1998; Stewart, 2008; Østby et al., 2011). This also applies to Zinda 
Jan district. Furthermore, the perspectives of interviewed farmers in 
Shakiban communities suggest economic and political inequalities felt 
by residents of Zinda Jan about resource access in this context may 
contribute to group organization around identity based on locality. One 
Mirab stated that problems with the Shakiban were all due to lack of 
water, and “if there is water, Shakiban is also part of Zinda Jan, why 
should we fight with each other?”30 Another seemed to discursively 
differentiate the Shakiban people from those in Zinda Jan, and under-
stood the district governor, who supported Shakiban, to be at fault for 
starting and then failing to resolve the issue.31 The communities of Zinda 
Jan and Shakiban are diverse, and these interviews suggested identity 
differences were constructed around economic grievances in this 
circumstance. These perspectives align with the understanding of 
Cederman et al. (2013, p. 37) that “articulation of grievances may help 
crystallize identity.” 
Interviewee perspectives further demonstrated how resource scarcity 
and governance may affect tensions with IDPs, thus potentially further 
undermining prospects for sustainable local peace. IDP communities 
settled downstream of the Zinda Jan canal, and have purchased farm-
land as well as utilize groundwater that local communities depend on in 
times of water scarcity. This resource use contributed to intercommunal 
tensions. Indeed, the qualitatively negative relationship among group 
identity, resource scarcity, and potential insecurity is further observable 
in local perspectives on IDPs. While group identity may be organized 
around various markers, different ethnic and cultural identities are often 
considered to be a basis for communal identity, which groups may 
mobilize around in relation to experienced horizontal inequalities 
(Brosché & Elversson, 2012; Stewart, 2000, 2005, 2008). In Zinda Jan, 
IDPs were “othered” due to perceived cultural differences.32 Locals – 
especially older generations – generally believed IDPs were threats to 
local security, and disliked IDPs living near, working with, or marrying 
into local families. Locals also often perceived IDPs to be in competition 
for water access, which would lead to problems and potential conflicts 
due to increased demands.33 These perspectives align with research 
suggesting migration into areas without access to resources is a 
local-scale stressor (especially among communities economically 
dependent on those resources) that can contribute to conflict (Barnett & 
Adger, 2007; Reuveny, 2007; Swain, 1996). 
However, some interviewees expressed opinions of IDPs that ranged 
from begrudgingly ambivalent to positive. Some stated they would 
accept IDPs based on an understanding of sharing an identity on a 
26 Interview: 1_ 1E.  
27 Interview: 1_3E. 
28 Interviews: 1_3E and 1_4E.  
29 Interviews: 1_6E and 1_3E.  
30 Interview: 1_4E.  
31 Interview: 1_3E.  
32 Interview: 2_11E.  
33 Interviews: 1_1E, 1_2E, 1_4E, 1_5E, 2_8 EE, and 1_7E. 
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national level.34 One man only recognized a right for IDPs to be in his 
community due to his acceptance of governmental authority. He stated 
that while he did not personally accept IDPs, the district governor told 
him they had a right to live in the village as citizens of Afghanistan.35 
One woman described how she believed IDPs caused problems in her 
district if they were too culturally different. If they did not bother local 
communities, she had no issue with them living in her community. She 
continued on to say that if they were to cause problems over water ac-
cess, the issues should be resolved legally.36 
The interviewees’ varying perspectives of IDPs in Zinda Jan echo 
arguments of how perceived threats of competition from external groups 
over already negligible resources have the potential to contribute to 
insecurity as well as local constructions of identity-based grievances 
against newcomers (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Gleditsch et al., 2007; 
Reuveny, 2007; Swain, 1996). However, in contrast, the more accepting 
perspectives indicate how local belief in a collective national identity, 
and acceptance of the legitimacy of state actors and laws, may mitigate 
possible contentious interactions between locals and IDPs, thus offering 
important insight into institutional development in the perceptions of 
citizens. 
The evidence from Zinda Jan presents a contrast to arguments of 
withdrawal of local communities from states (Scott, 2009), and confirms 
local populations prefer the state as a provider of security, justice, and 
services (Krampe, 2016; van der Lijn & De Zwaan, 2019). Local accep-
tance of IDPs based on belief of a national identity and state authority, 
grievances against and dismissal of the district governor, and local belief 
in the importance of government involvement in water management 
indicate the importance of and community desire for a state. However, 
local perspectives from interviewees of the motivations of the 
post-conflict government, as well as international peacebuilders theo-
retically meant to help rebuild and renegotiate the state–society rela-
tionship, were generally negative. These negative opinions were not due 
to the dam, but were related to the broader ineffective and imposing 
liberal peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan (Kalborg, 2014). This sug-
gests how the conflict context and impacts of international actors sub-
stantially complicate and affect local legitimization of state and 
international peacebuilders (Krampe & Ekman, 2020; Themnér & Ohl-
son, 2014). 
While some interviewees viewed the government positively, many 
believed it worked in its own interest, and often worked with foreigners 
at the expense of its own people. As others suggested, the staggered 
international funding and involvement over decades of conflict in 
Afghanistan also likely influenced a significant distrust of the abilities 
and motivations of international actors among Zinda Jan locals (Karl-
borg, 2014; Rubin, 2006). Interviewees commented on how interna-
tional actors aid only in the short term, and discussed their perceptions 
of the incentives of international actors as empirically self-interested. 
One man stated that “foreigners, if they do anything in Afghanistan, if 
they sacrifice their lives, it is in their own interest.”37 That the state and 
international peacebuilders are widely perceived as illegitimate, based 
on their actions in the post-conflict context (Karlborg, 2014), is a com-
pounding challenge for sustainable peacebuilding. 
7. Conclusion 
This article contributes to an improved understanding of the impli-
cations of future climate development projects in conflict-affected 
states, and their inherent contribution and/or risk to broader peace 
processes. To provide insight on this question, the research queries how 
the management of the Salma Dam project in Afghanistan has affected 
the prospect for peace in downstream local communities. The Salma 
Dam was chosen as it represents activities addressing mitigation and 
adaptation. A recently developed analytical approach is used to analyze 
interrelated social, economic, and political dynamics experienced in 
downstream communities in the Zinda Jan district after the construction 
of the Salma Dam, and how these dynamics may affect the prospect for 
sustainable peace. We find local downstream communities experienced 
increased water scarcity due to management of water controlled by the 
dam, lack of necessary infrastructure to carry water from the dam’s 
reservoir to downstream communities, and outdated water allocation 
regulations. This scarcity was likely further compounded by climate 
change. Our analysis highlights how these dynamics and subsequent 
experience of water scarcity can facilitate grievances and low-level 
violence and insecurity among local communities. The management of 
the dam – a result of government regulations influenced by international 
actors – contributed to community conflict as it did not factor in local 
needs. Of note is that this research reflects perspectives through summer 
2018. Later institutional developments positively influenced the man-
agement of the dam and release of its water, but these are beyond the 
scope of this study. These institutional changes demonstrate the need for 
the type of analysis demonstrated in this paper, as it anticipates key 
challenges that institutional development can actively prevent. While 
Fig. 7. Analytical approach demonstrating impacts of the Salma Dam project on peacebuilding efforts in Zinda Jan, Herat Province, Afghanistan. Adapted from 
Swatuk et al. (2018). 
34 Interviews: 2_15E and 2_5E.  
35 Interview: 1_4E.  
36 Interview: 1_2E. 37 Interview: 2_9E. 
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climate development projects likely have distributional impacts that 
may contribute to resentment, the question is how severe these impacts 
may be, and how they can best be managed. Additionally, this research 
demonstrates how the conflict-affected context influences local-scale 
interpretations and responses to the legitimacies of actors meant to 
ensure stability, thus further challenging peacebuilding on a local scale. 
In the context of Afghanistan, it is important to remain aware that the 
conflict history influenced the state’s capability to provide access to 
water. It also broadly influences local trust and awareness of state and 
international actors. International involvement, which backed long- 
term policy reforms and short-term water management projects in 
Zinda Jan, had a negative impact on resource access in the district. 
The case study of Zinda Jan indicates that in the context of liberal 
peacebuilding (premised on economic development and large-scale 
structural adjustment), post-conflict water management reforms and 
climate development projects were unsustainable, and failed to effec-
tively account for the needs and ensure the participation of local groups. 
Past interventions have been short term, creating temporary opportu-
nities for the benefit of only a few. Sustainable interventions with the 
ability to create and ensure jobs, especially in areas affected by climate 
change and that are dependent on agriculture, are of importance (Jawid 
& Khadjavi, 2019). 
The findings of this article stress the need for further research into 
the security implications of climate development projects in conflict- 
affected states. In the Zinda Jan setting, the micro dynamics felt after 
the completion of the Salma Dam saw grievances among groups and 
state actors rise, and compromised local-scale peace. This knowledge 
will be a prerequisite to promote inclusive and sustainable management 
strategies and allow for affected communities to actively work with state 
actors in all stages of sustainably managing related natural resources to 
best meet their needs. The use of international agendas conforming with 
donor priorities aims or techniques for climate change or sustainable 
development can create intersecting local-scale social, political, eco-
nomic, and ecological challenges. Such issues can impede sustainable 
peacebuilding, as demonstrated by the Zinda Jan case study. 
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